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Illegal Reentry and Denial of Bail to
Undocumented Defendants: Unjust Tools for
Social Control of Undocumented Latino
Immigrants
PATRICK KIRBY MADDEN*
When we want you, we'll call you; when we don't-git.
- Ernesto Galarza'
I. Introduction
Context matters. The more context one has, whether it is historical,
structural, statistical, or constitutional, it helps one to better see the true
purpose and effects of an action. Superficially, the criminal statute of
"Illegal Reentry" 2 seems like a basic rule to deter those that are likely to
commit crime from entering the United States. Similarly, a prosecutor's
argument at a detention hearing that due to the fact that Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") may remove a defendant prior to trial, the
defendant must be detained for risk of flight may sound like a valid
argument. However, once these actions are viewed in the context of the
history of undocumented Latino immigrants in the United States, are placed
within the structure of a model of social control that has largely dictated
that history, are reviewed for their statistical impact on a specific group, and
have their reasoning and functions exposed as out of accord with the
principles set forth in the Constitution, both this statute and this frequently
* Patrick "Kirby" Madden is a J.D. Candidate at University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, 2014. 1 wish to thank my Mom, my Dad, Pete, Mari, as well as all of the incredible
individuals that I have met during my law school experience that have taught me so much about
the law, the world, and myself. I would further like to thank Professor Hadar Aviram for
providing me with the mental and physical settings to write this note and everyone at the Hastings
Race and Poverty Law Journal, specifically all of those that contributed to the publication of this
note.
1. Ernesto Galarza, Without Benefit of Lobby, 66 SURVEY 181, 181 (1931).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012).
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utilized argument are seen for what they are: two harsh tools in a larger
system of social control of undocumented Latino immigrants.
Section II of this note provides the proper historical context and lens of
social control with which to view these two tools. The next two sections
focus on the tools themselves. Section III describes the inner workings of
Illegal Reentry before delving into its specific history and the injustices it
inflicts upon the undocumented community. Similarly, Section IV
navigates the details of federal bail and immigration statutes, and then
describes how prosecutors systematically deny bail to undocumented
immigrants and why it is legally fraudulent. Finally, Section V puts all of
this together to explicitly expose this statute and this practice as tools of an
ongoing system of social control.
II. The Proper Theory in Which to View Past and Current
Tools of Social Control
In order to fully understand the purpose and effect of current tools of
social control of undocumented Latino immigrants it is critical to view them
in proper historical context. Unfortunately, mainstream America's analysis
of undocumented immigration often lacks this context. While, "[1]ike
slavery, conquest tested the ideals of the United States[,]. . . [t]o most
twentieth century Americans, the legacy of slavery was serious business,
while the legacy of conquest was not."3 What is provided here is by no
means intended to be a comprehensive historical perspective on the subject;
to attempt to recount that long and intricate history here would be
unrealistic and perhaps even discourteous. The purpose of this section is
simply to provide the requisite historical and theoretical context to
understand how current legal tools are a continuation of the policies that,
since the time of conquest, distort laws, the Constitution, and human
decency in pursuit of social control.
The common theory that explains undocumented Latino immigration
is straightforward. It "stresses the economic disparity between the U.S. and
Mexico as the 'but-for' causal explanation for massive undocumented
migration," by "[d]rawing heavily upon classical 'push-pull' theory and
presupposing rationally maximizing individuals.'A Perpetuated by the
media and political actors who emphasize the "threatening impact of
undocumented immigrants, especially undocumented Mexicans, on the
economic, ecological, and cultural well-being of United States citizens," the
3. PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST (1987), reprinted in RACE AND
RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA, 285 (Juan Parea, Richard Delgado,
Angela Harris, Jean Stefancic, Stephanie Wildman, 2007).
4. Gerald P. Lopez, Don't We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1722-23
(2012).
340 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11I
UNJUST TOOLS FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
theory assumes that "well-targeted and vigorously enforced laws can
control, and ultimately solve, the undocumented immigration problem."'
While there may be accurate elements of this theory, its undoing is that it
fails to account for the actual, specific interests that shape immigration
policy.
To paint a more detailed picture, a theory must take into account the
powerful interests of businesses that rely on cheap labor, the temperature of
voters' opinions regarding undocumented immigrants, and the racism
inherent in both. A theory that successfully explains how policymakers
balance these interests through a wide-ranging system of social control is
what Professor Gerald Lopez titles his "Rival Theory." 6 The Rival Theory
asserts that by intentionally manipulating prohibitions and permissions,
policymakers have effectively created a single, overarching immigration
regime out of two immigration systems: "[o]ne is documented . .. and the
other undocumented." 7 Permissions are not accidental gaps left in the law,
but rather choices made by Congress to allow actors dependent on
undocumented immigration to "do what they must in order ... to serve the
[] needs of the U.S."" This apparatus allows the U.S. government to make
"theatrical productions of the prohibitions being enforced, of apprehensions
at the border and raids, sweeps, and mass deportations inland," when
electoral or economic pressures indicate when to slow undocumented
immigration.9 When these same pressures dictate a need "to increase
undocumented Mexican laborers, the U.S. typically emphasizes
prohibitions and diverts attention away from permissions, including the de
facto sorts signaled through conscious under-enforcement."o By creating
an expansive selection of tools in the form of "stock practices, policies, and
justifications," policymakers are able to respond effectively to any
circumstance."
Racism runs through and emboldens both of these pressures felt by
policymakers. When John O'Sullivan declared that it was "Our manifest
destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free
development of our yearly multiplying millions," his use of "our" referred
to the Anglo-Saxon man.12 At the time he said those words in 1845, the
5. Lopez, supra note 4 at 1722-23.
6. Id. at 1728.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1728-29.
9. Id. at 1729.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1730.
12. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492 - PRESENT 149
(1995).
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United States was gearing up for the Mexican-American War.' 3 The most
popular reason, here stated by Congressman Delano of Ohio, to oppose the
war was a fear of "Americans mingling with an inferior people who
'embrace all shades of color ... a sad compound of Spanish, English,
Indian and negro bloods ... and resulting, it is said, in the production of a
slothful, ignorant race of beings."'l 4 The same industrious and arrogant
expression of racism of O'Sullivan has allowed mainstream America to
ignore the conquest and mistreatment of Latinos up to the present day, just
as the contemptuous and scared expression of racism of Delano can be seen
in the responses to the Latino immigrant presence.
In retrospect, it is easy to spot examples of policy makers condoning
the flow of undocumented labor. As employers began to recruit Mexican
labor in the late nineteenth century due to the growing scarcity of Asian
labor, "the federal government of the U.S. played a role that mingled dejure
"'15assertiveness and de facto submissiveness. Initially, Congress imposed a
per-head tax on immigrants entering the U.S. and excluded those that could
be a burden on taxpayers.16 However, it left the execution of the law to the
states, which had little incentive or capability to follow through.' 7 Decades
later, in reaction to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment, Congress, in order
"[t]o enable Mexican migrants to come unhindered by formal legal
restrictions principally enacted to target southern and eastern Europeans
during and after World War I," provided the Ninth Proviso, "which waived
the head tax and literacy requirement of the 1917 Immigration Act."' 8 This
pattern reemerged as the economy gained steam during and after World
War II. With the implementation of the Bracero Program and "the federal
government abandoning any quality enforcement role"' 9 in its oversight of
employers, those employers utilized their unsupervised authority to subvert
the Program's standards for treatment of workers and increased their hiring
of undocumented immigrants, in effect, freeing them from compliance
altogether.20
In the periods of time between these permitted influxes of immigrants,
policymakers reacted to political pressure by amplifying the creation and
enforcement of prohibitions. In the years prior to the Great Depression, the
13. Zinn, supra note 12.
14. Id. at 155.
15. Lopez, supra note 4, at 1756.
16. Id. at 1756-57; GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO, LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES:
INVITATION AND EXILE (1997), reprinted in RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA, 341 (Juan Parea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, Jean Stefancic, Stephanie
Wildman, 2007).
17. Lopez, supra note 4, at 1757.
18. Id. at 1760.
19. Id. at 1767.
20. Id. at 1766-69; CARRASCO, supra note 16, at 344.
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influx of immigrants led to increases in discriminatory tailoring and
enforcement of criminal laws,2 1 the elimination of bilingual education,22
segregation due to white fears of health risks,2 3 and the exclusion of
immigrants from public benefits.2 4  During the Depression, with many
white citizens out of work, the reaction to the possibility of Latinos
occupying potential jobs was so hostile that through various procedures,
"[b]y the end of the Depression, over 400,000 Latinos were 'repatriated' to
Mexico without any formal deportation proceedings, including thousands of
American citizens." 25 The nightmares of these injustices were revived a
few decades later in the reaction, entitled "Operation Wetback," to the post-
war influx of Latino labor, when "[b]etween 1954 and 1959.. . over 3.7
million Latinos [were] deported." 26
To better understand the present, it is crucial to see the history of
undocumented Latino immigrants in the U.S. as a history of policymakers
reacting to electoral and economic pressures, pressures which are frequently
emboldened by racism. This dynamic still exists today. In order to react to
these pressures, policymakers have manufactured a multitude of statutes
and practices that allow them to manipulate the undocumented Latino
immigrant population to their advantage. Viewing the past and present
through this lens allows one to more deeply understand that certain criminal
offenses and prosecutorial practices are tools in this system of social
control.
III. Illegal Reentry
A. Definition, Penalties, and Prescribed Defenses of the Statute
Section 1326 of Title Eight of the United States Code is titled "Reentry
of Removed Aliens."27 It is often referred to as "Illegal Reentry." While
the statute is found in the title generally containing laws regarding aliens
and nationality, there is no question that, in action, it is fundamentally a
criminal statute. The statute applies criminal sanctions to "any alien
who ... has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
21. ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS 19 (2003).
22. CARRASCO, supra note 16, at 341.
23. Lopez, supra note 4, at 1762.
24. CARRASCO, supra note 16, at 343.
25. Id. at 343-44; Karen Grigsby Gates, Rodriguez Kept 'Mexican Repatriation' From Being
Forgotten, NAT'L PUB RADIO (July 10, 2013), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/07/10/200644779/Rodriguez-Kept-Mexican-Repatria
tion-From-Being-Forgotten.
26. CARRASCO, supra note 16, at 347.
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012).
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removal is outstanding, and thereafter . .. enters, attempts to enter, or is at
any time found in, the United States."28
Anyone fitting this description will at least be punished by "fine[s]
under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both." 2 9 However,
subsection (b) of the statute is tailored to administer four specific
punishments to four categories of individuals who have prior offenses. The
first, (b)(1), declares that those individuals "whose removal was subsequent
to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving
drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an
aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both." 3 0 Additionally, subsection (b)(2) states that
individuals "whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission
of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title,
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."31 The latter two of the four
punishments are more specific than the first two. The next subsection
maintains that individuals who are deported for offenses related to terrorism
shall be fined and "imprisoned for a period of 10 years, which sentence
shall not run concurrently with any other sentence."32 Subsection (b)(4)
punishes those individuals that the Attorney General elected to remove
before the completion of their prison terms with a sentence of up to 10
years. Relatedly, subsection (c) maintains that, in addition to the terms set
out by (b)(4), an individual that returns to the United States after being
deported prior to the completion of a term of imprisonment shall be
required to complete their previous term of imprisonment. 3 4
All five potential punishments are not applicable to an individual if
"prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or his
application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for
admission."35 Similarly, these punishments are not applicable if the "alien
[] establish[es] that he was not required to obtain such advance consent
under this chapter or any prior Act."36
Subsection (d) provides the defendant with potential relief from the
penalties of this statute.37 In 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012).
29. Id.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2012).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2012).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(3) (2012).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(4) (2012).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(c) (2012).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (2012).
36. Id.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012).
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL344 [Vol. 11I
heard a challenge to a previous incarnation of § 1326 in the case of United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez.38 The Court took the case in order to settle a
circuit split on whether a defendant could challenge the underlying, original
removal order on which a new § 1326 charge is based.39 The defense
asserted that Congress, when writing § 1326, intended to allow the
defendant to challenge the original removal order and that not allowing the
defendant to challenge the order was a violation of his Due Process
Rights. 40 The Court held that while Congress did not intend to allow the
underlying order to be challenged, the order must be challengeable in order
for the statute to comport with Due Process.4 1 Applying the fact that "[its]
cases establish that where a determination made in an administrative
proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a
criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the
administrative proceeding," the Court found that the defendants were not
properly informed of their right to appeal or suspend the deportation, and
were therefore denied their Due Process Rights.42
Subsection (d) allows § 1326 to comport with the Right to Due
Process, effectively providing the main defense to the offense. In order to
utilize this (defense and escape § 1326 sanctions, the defendant must
demonstrate that "(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that
may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation
proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of
the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was
fundamentally unfair."43
B. History of the Statute
Illegal Reentry first originated as Section 276 in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (The McCarran-Walter Act) under the name
"Reentry of Deported Alien."44 The primary predecessor to the statute was
8 U.S.C. § 180(a), which was repealed upon § 1326's passage into law.45
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was a milestone
immigration bill. Famously, it ended the exclusion of Asian peoples from
lawfully immigrating to the United States, but upheld a quota system based
38. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
39. Id. at 833-34.
40. Id. at 834-35.
41. Id. at 841-42.
42. Id. at 837-40 (alteration in original).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012).
44. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat 276 (1952),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-66/pdf/STATUTE-66-Pgl63.pdf.
45. 481 U.S. at 835.
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on a national origin.46 The Act was passed at the start of the Cold War,
which turned its passage into a battle between two major strategies of U.S.
leaders in strengthening the country. 7 Some leaders, led by President
Truman, were foreign policy focused and wanted to broaden the United
States' appeal to all parts of the world.4 8 Others, led by Senator McCarran
of Nevada, were concerned about subversive elements entering the U.S. that
could "threaten the foundations of American life."49 President Truman
vetoed the Bill upon its passage, but overwhelming Congressional support
allowed it to supersede his Presidential veto to become law.50
In a more equally numbered debate, one would suppose that given the
primary concerns of each side, a law ensuring that individuals who had
been previously removed would be a relatively uncontroversial statute to
insert into the bill. Those concerned with subversive activity would very
likely be passionate about its passage and those with the primary concern of
broadening U.S. appeal were quite likely not concerned about the U.S.'s
appeal to former deportees. So in this real-life debate, where concerns of
the subversion of American life were the primary focus of a vast majority of
legislators, the statute was likely an obvious, unquestioned inclusion.
Further, the individuals subjected to the statute's penalties have no
political capital to fight it. Those subjected to the statute are most often
lacking in financial capital as well, and given the function of the statute, any
attempt to speak out against it may result in the statute being applied to the
individual speaking out or those that they are advocating on their behalf.
The anonymity of those subjected to the statute creats a void that invites
Americans and their politicians to insert the faces of the scourge that exists
in the mind of the beholder. Thus, arguments against it are not to be taken
seriously.
This lack of political capital lies in stark contrast to the employers of
Latino laborers, who were able to dampen the criminal penalties on
employing aliens during the debate over the Bill.5' After the defeat of the
employer penalties, a New York Times editorial noted that, "[i]t is
remarkable how some of the same Senators and Representatives who are all
for enacting the most rigid barriers against immigration from Southern
Europe suffer from a sudden blindness when it comes to protecting the
southern border of the United States."52 The editorial sarcastically noticed






51. Lopez, supra note 4, at 1769-70.
52. Editorial, Wetback Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1952, at 24 (quoted in Lopez, supra
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that, "[t]his peculiar weakness is most noticeable among members from
Texas and the Southwest, where the wetbacks happen to be principally
employed." The employers who had sufficiently persuaded their
representatives to not allow the Bill to contain sanctions that could be
utilized against them did not mind sanctions that could be leveled at former
deportees, as there was a plentiful supply of labor.54
Illegal Reentry was borne out of an Act passed by a legislature that is
historically notable for its skepticism of potential entrants into the United
States subverting the American way of life. If that is a legislature's primary
concern, one of the first logical laws to make is one that punishes an
individual who had already been deemed unfit for the United States but
attempted to enter illegally. The individuals effected by the law did not
have the ability or interest to stand up against it. Their employers had the
ability but lacked interest. Given the New York Times editorial's concern
with the southern border, the fact that § 1326 was passed, and laws
sanctioning employers were even considered, it is fair to wonder if this
frustration was at least related to the frustration that led to the 1954
unleashing of Operation Wetback.
Over the sixty-plus years since § 1326's passage, the statue has
expanded its net as well as its hammer. Originally, the statute simply stated
that an alien who had been deported and then entered, attempted to enter, or
was found in the U.S. without permission was guilty of a felony and could
be fined up to one thousand dollars and sentenced to a prison term of up to
two years. As time passed, the statute was revised, with a few especially
relevant changes in the late eighties and early nineties. In 1988, Congress
added the increases of five- and fifteen-year limits to those guilty of
multiple misdemeanors or felonies, and aggravated felonies, respectively. 56
Congress, in 1994, ensured that the statue applied to deportation orders that
were pursuant to stipulations and to those individuals who had committed
three or more misdemeanors involving drugs or violence.57 It also
increased the penalty on the newly included misdemeanor defendants and
felons to a ceiling of ten years and on defendants with prior aggravated
felonies from fifteen to twenty years.58 Finally, in 1996, Congress included
the portion of the statute that pertains to those who have committed terror-
note 4, at 1770).
53. Wetback Problem, supra note 52.
54. Lopez, supra note 4, at 1770.
55. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, supra note 44.
56. An Act to prevent the manufacturing, distribution, and use of illegal drugs, and for other
purposes, Pub L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181, § 7345 (amended 1988).




related offenses. 59 Each amendment to § 1326 has either casted a larger net
or added more weight to its punishments.
C. The Current Use and Effects of the Offense
According to the Department of Justice, 44% of all felony cases filed
in 2010 were immigration offenses.60 Of those immigration offenses, an
overwhelming amount, 81%, were Illegal Reentry offenses. 6 ' Thus, in
2010, 35.64% of all federal felony criminal offenses were Illegal Reentry
offenses. It is the fastest growing immigration referral to United States
Attorneys.62 The offense was prosecuted 67% of the time.6 3 However,
once the 33% of the time that a magistrate judge disposed of the matter is
taken into consideration, it is clear that when given a § 1326 case,
prosecutors decline to prosecute in 1% of all cases.64
Relatedly, 97% of all immigration defendants were convicted and 97%
of those convictions were obtained through guilty pleas. 6 5 According to a
2009 DOJ report, the conviction rate for immigration offenses is
significantly higher than other categories of offenses. The 2009 report
shows that while immigration offenses had a 97% conviction rate that year,
all other categories of offenses had conviction rates between 84.3% (acts of
violence) and 89.3% (drug offenses).66 Drug offenses were the only
category of offense prosecuted at a similar rate as immigration offenses.67
The majority of the growth in prosecution of Illegal Reentry is
occurring in the Federal Districts in the Southwest, along the border of the
United States and Mexico. 6 8  In 2010, the Southwest border districts
handled 78% of all illegal reentry referrals, up from 73% in 2008.69
Of the 23,102 total defendants in Illegal Reentry cases in 2010, 96.5%
were male and over 80% were between the ages of 25 and 49.70 The report
59. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat
1214 (1996).
60. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 23 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/readingroom/reports/asr2010/1 Ostatrpt.pdf.
61. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FED. JUSTICE
SYSTEM, 2010 6 (2013) [hereinafter 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/iofJsl0.pdf.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 6.
66. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009 12 (2011) [hereinafter
2009 REPORT], available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
67. Id.
68. 2010 REPORT, supra note 61, at 18.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 22.
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states that 98% of those defendants were Latino.7 1 A more specific
breakdown shows that of the defendants, 84.6% were Mexican, 11.8% were
Central American, and 2.3% were Caribbean. 72  No other region or
nationality had a representation over 1%.73 The 2009 report seems to reflect
that most defendants of immigration offenses tend to be poor. Of
defendants whose immigration cases terminated in 2009, 49% were
represented by a public defender and 24.1% were represented by a Criminal
Justice Act-appointed attorney. 74
These demographics are reflected in the corresponding federal
incarceration rates and statistics. In 2010, there were 17,720 Mexican
citizens in federal prison for immigration offenses, up from 2,074 in 1994. 7
In 2010, 32.5% of all federal prisoners were Hispanic, more than double the
percentage, 13%, of Hispanic representation in the United States according
to the 2010 U.S. Census.76 The Southwestern districts are notable again in
these statistics, not for their amount of immigration offenders, but for the
rate at which immigration offenders are subjected to prison sentences. In
2009, 84.1% of immigration offenders were sent to prison in Southwestern
federal districts, compared with an overall imprisonment rate of 75.1% for
all immigration offenders. 77
The median sentence for Illegal Reentry in 2010 was 15 months,
which was down from 27 months in 2003-2004 and 37 months in 1999-
2000.78 While that may seem to reflect a more lenient sentencing agenda
taking hold, it is important to recall that the prosecution rate for this crime
has risen sharply over the same period of time and prosecutors rarely
decline to prosecute an Illegal Reentry offense. This decrease in average
sentences more likely displays an increase in the prosecution of individuals
who are not eligible for the higher sentences set out by the statute, as well
as the defendant's low likelihood of success at trial coupling with the
statute's harsh penalties to create the aforementioned 97% guilty plea rate.
The report states that 92.6% of Illegal Reentry defendants had a prior arrest
in 2010, 64.8% had felony convictions, 20.6% had misdemeanor
convictions, and 14.6% had no prior convictions. 7 9  Of those felony
convictions, around two-thirds dealt with either violence or drugs.80 A final
71. 2010 REPORT, supra note 61, at 22.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 33.
76. 2009 REPORT, supra note 66, at 16; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION:
2010 2 (2011).
77. 2009 REPORT, supra note 66, at 13.
78. 2010 REPORT, supra note 61, at 30.
79. Id. at 26.
80. Id.
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important statistic regarding priors and sentencing is that of the 15,234
unlawful entry and reentry prisoners released in 2007, 13% returned to
federal prison within three years.8' Of that number, 8.8% returned due to a
violation of their supervision and 91.2% returned because of a new
offense.82 Given the federal jurisdiction, the fact that federal arrests
compromise 1% of all arrests in the U.S., 83 and an individual's likely
deportation after release, it is likely that the "new offense" is Illegal
Reentry.
Together, all of these statistics paint a detailed picture of how the
offense of Illegal Reentry is being used, and tells us a great deal about why
it is being used. It is overwhelmingly used against working-age, poor,
Latino men. The recidivism rate coupled with the harsh, almost certain
sentence and deportation indicate that many individuals are knowingly
risking heavy consequences-likely for the few things that are worth
risking it for: health, family, and finances. While many defendants do
indeed have prior felonies, the DOJ reports do not discuss any information
regarding the length of time since the underlying offense or of repeat Illegal
Reentry offenders tending to have original underlying offenses of a greater
magnitude.
It is clear that due to the overwhelming difficulties of winning at trial
and the stiff penalties a conviction carries, defendants enter guilty pleas at a
high rate. Due to the fact that the defendant, who is not to be present in the
U.S., is present in a courtroom within the U.S., there are only two avenues
for a defendant to escape a guilty verdict. The first avenue, as mentioned
above, is to challenge the underlying order under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). This
requires the defendant to show that they exhausted any possible
administrative remedies that were available at the time, that the proceeding
improperly denied them of judicial review, and that the entry of the order
was fundamentally unfair.84 The other avenue is similar: to remind a jury
that in a criminal case the burden is on the government to show that the
defendant has no claim to citizenship and hope that the government does
not reach that standard. Both avenues are exceedingly difficult.
It is also visible that these strong advantages are not lost on
prosecutors. These offenses are charged in great number and are turned
down due to prosecutorial discretion a miniscule percentage of the time. It
would be naive to think that this increase in prosecution, especially in the
Southwest, is simply a result of a greater number of offenders and not
institutional incentives, such as focusing on crimes that are plentiful and
81. 2010 REPORT, supra note 61, at 37.
82. Id.
83. 2009 REPORT, supra note 66, at 1.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012).
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easy to prosecute in order to increase prosecution rates. This is reflected in
some of the programs in place in the Southwestern border districts. The
2009 DOJ report informs that "Operation Streamline, a federal zero-
tolerance prosecutorial initiative, began in the Border Patrol's Del Rio
Sector (located in the Western District of Texas) in December 2005.",85 It
goes on to explain that under Operation Streamline, authorities made sure to
charge first-time offenders crossing the border with a federal criminal
offense rather than steering these nonviolent immigration offenders to
federal civil deportation proceedings or allowing voluntary removal. 86 It
further discloses that Operation Streamline ensures that those crossing the
border "are charged with a misdemeanor and face up to 6 months in prison
before being deported. The federal conviction counts toward the more
serious charge of illegal reentry if the offender attempts to reenter the U.S.
illegally (a felony punishable with up to 20 years in prison)." 87 Operation
Streamline is now active in most of the federal districts along the U.S.-
Mexico border.88
Another example comes from the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office. The Office, which claims to operate under an
"immigration-neutral" regime, sends district attorneys "to work for the
Office of the United States Attorney on immigration crime cases brought in
federal court. Under the program, local district attorneys work exclusively
on 'illegal reentry' cases-prosecuting felons and suspected gang members
who reenter the United States without permission under the federal
immigration law."89 The Los Angeles District Attorney utilizes this unique
program because "it gives local prosecutors the ability to use federal
immigration law to incapacitate persons perceived to pose criminal threats,
without infecting local criminal proceedings with immigration concerns."90
These are just two examples, but each displays the zeal with which
prosecutors go out of their way to implement Illegal Reentry due to its
overpowering combination of punishment and provability.
Both the expansion of the definition of "aggravated felony" in recent
years and the fact that an individual may be convicted due to a prior
conviction in the distant past cause Illegal Reentry to be at odds with
American notions of justice. Over the last twenty to thirty years, the
definition of what constitutes an aggravated felony has expanded
exponentially. While it has always contained the crimes one would expect




89. Ingrid v. Eagley, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126, 1194-95 (2013).
90. Id. at 1195.
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it to, it now includes crimes such as gambling, forgery, passport fraud,
trafficking a controlled substance, as well as illegal entry and reentry if the
prior removal occurred pursuant to an aggravated felony.9' Whenever new
offenses have been added to the list, their definitions as aggravated felonies
apply retroactively. 92 These categorizations are what dictate the sentence of
the current Illegal Reentry case and the facts that underlie them are of no
consequence. 93 For example, it will not matter whatsoever if a defendant is
a drug kingpin or a drug mule, as long as they have the same prior
conviction. Additionally, the statute contains no limitations on how far in
the past the prior conviction or deportation order occurred and provides no
expungement procedure.
The primary action the offense is intended to punish is in its title:
Illegal Reentry. It is ostensibly an immigration regulation in that sense.
However, given that the incredibly vast differences in maximum sentences
depend on the prior offenses, the actual punishment of the offender is
dictated by their prior offense. There is often no functionally different
characteristics of the proximate crime committed by two individuals, yet
one individual faces a maximum sentence ten times the length of the other's
maximum sentence. Considering that these prior offenses could have been
committed decades prior to the current offense, could have been
overcharged considering the underlying facts, or could have been redefined
as an aggravated felony after it was committed, it seems that Illegal Reentry
does not only primarily punish the prior offense, but does so recklessly
disregarding relevant details. Although it likely does not approach the
Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
Illegal Reentry can easily and often violate the basic, everyday notion of
justice that the Double Jeopardy Clause represents.
IV. Systematic Denial of Bail to Undocumented Defendants
A. Bail Reform Act of 1966
Congress updated the federal standards by which bail procedures
would be governed with the Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984 ("BRA").
Congress' purpose in passing the BRA was "to revise the practices relating
to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not
needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges, to
91. Judith A. Warner, The Social Construction of the Criminal Alien in Immigration Law,
Enforcement Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigrant Stereotyping,
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL BOUNDARIEs 56, 63 (Winter 2005-06); 8 U.S.C. §§
I 101(a)(43)(B) (2012); 1 101(a)(43)(0) (2012).
92. Warner, supra note 91, at 64.
93. See generally Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282 (2013).
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testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice
nor the public interest." 94 By enacting the BRA, Congress enacted these
notions of fairness into the law. The BRA requires that, "unless the judicial
officer determines that [] release will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or
the community," then the "judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of
the person on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the court." 95 This requirement
is to be adhered to unless the "judicial officer finds that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person in the community." 9 6
The judicial officer's determination of the suitability of an individual
defendant is to be individually tailored to the specific circumstances of that
defendant. 97 Once again, this does not mean that it is to be tailored to the
offense the defendant allegedly committed or tailored to a general trait a
defendant may share with a group. It is to be individually tailored to the
specific offense and circumstances of the individual defendant. All of these
intentions and statutory rules, of course, find their roots in the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's demand that, "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required." 98
While the BRA considers persons in the United States illegally, it at no
point dictates that those persons are to be detained upon that basis alone.
Subsection (e)(3) describes the crimes that may bring a rebuttable
presumption of detention: certain drug offenses where the maximum
sentence is over 10 years, specific major violent or potentially violent
crimes, crimes that are international in nature, acts of terrorism transcending
international boundaries, slavery and international human trafficking
offenses, and specific offenses involving minor victims.99 The statute does
not list immigration offenses amongst those offenses. 00
The BRA explicitly lists the factors that the judge shall use in
determining whether the person is a flight risk or a danger to others.'0 The
judge will make this determination during a detention hearing, which would
be prompted by a motion in "a case that involves - (A) a serious risk that
such person will flee; or (B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or
94. The Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub.L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012), see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (2012).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2012).
97. Stack v. Boyle, 342 US 1, 4 (1951) (stating that, "[t]he traditional standards as expressed
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be applied in each case to each defendant").
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 1.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) (2012).
100. Id.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012).
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attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to
threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror."' 02 The judge
is to take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against the person, the person's history and
characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of any danger a release may
pose to the community.103 While some courts read immigration status into
the history and characteristics of the person, immigration status is not
explicitly mentioned in the text of this subsection. The only place in the
BRA that explicitly mentions immigration status is 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d),
which allows the judicial officer to impose a ten-day detention for a person
who "is not a citizen of the United States or lawfully admitted for
permanent residence,"l04 and, "may flee or pose a danger to any other
person or the community." 05 The statute explicitly states that the purpose
of this ten-day detention is to provide the appropriate official, in most cases
an ICE official, to take the individual into custody.106 If the official does
not take the individual into custody, then "such person shall be treated in
accordance with the other provisions of this section, notwithstanding the
applicability of other provisions of law governing release pending trial or
deportation or exclusion proceedings."' 07
Taken together, the fact that the list of offenses containing a rebuttable
presumption of detention does not list immigration status, that immigration
status is not explicitly stated as a factor to be considered by a judge, and
that the only section mentioning immigration status states that the defendant
is to be treated in accordance with the rest of the statute if the specific time-
sensitive steps are not followed, strongly suggests that immigration status,
in itself, is not a factor that should persuade a judge in his decision of
whether to grant a defendant bail. Further, when these provisions are
placed in the broader context of the Eighth Amendment, the individualized
nature of this sort of inquiry, the multiple options judges have before them
in order to ensure a defendant's appearance, and Congress' stated purpose
for the BRA, it is unequivocally clear that "Congress chose not to exclude
deportable aliens from consideration for release or detention in criminal
proceedings."' 08
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (2012).
103. Id.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(1)(B) (2012).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (2012).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Adomako, 150 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1304 (M.D.Fla. 2001) (ruling that the
court must apply the normal bail procedure when determining the potential detention of a
deportable alien).
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B. Immigration and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ("INA"), as amended,
sets out the majority of U.S. immigration law. 0 9 The primary statute within
the INA that lays out the basic parameters of the detention and removal
procedure of non-citizens by the U.S. Government, entitled "Detention and
Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed," is found at 8 U.S.C. § 123 1.1o The
statute states unequivocally that, "[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien," and demand that "[u]nder no circumstance
during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an alien who"
is inadmissible or deportable."' A subsection that is especially pertinent to
Illegal Reentry defendants, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), states that, "[i]f the
Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally
after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of
removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is
not subject to being reopened or reviewed." 1 2 It further asserts that, "the
alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and
the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the
reentry."' 13
Most important in a discussion of the relation of removal procedure
and bail procedure is the point at which the removal period begins. Section
1231 attempts to state this clearly, but there is a bit of ambiguity within the
statute regarding this issue. It states that,
The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The
date the order of removal becomes administratively final. (ii) If the
removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of
the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order. (iii) If
the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration
process), the date the alien is released from detention or
confinement. 1
Most important for the criminal context is Section iii. It may dictate
that the removal period begin the date an alien is released from detention or
confinement, however, in the context of bail the true answer then lays in the
definitions of "detention" and "confinement."
The statute also limits the possibility that detention prior to trial could
be the kind of detention or confinement referred to when it explains that
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012).
Ill. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(2) (2012).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(5) (2012).
113. Id.
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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generally "the Attorney General may not remove an alien who is sentenced
to imprisonment until the alien is released from imprisonment. Parole,
supervised release, probation, or possibility of arrest or further
imprisonment is not a reason to defer removal."' 15  All of the types of
detention and confinement listed are all forms that come after an entry of
judgment, which tends to support the idea that being released on bail or on
one's own recognizance does not trigger the removal period. This is
supported by the fact that all of the exceptions to this general rule require
that the defendant is confined "pursuant to a final conviction." 116 The fact
that the general rule does not allow the removal of an alien during detention
or confinement, that it mentions only forms of detention and confinement
that occur after a final conviction as non-valid reasons for deferral of
removal, and that the exceptions to this rule still require a final judgment
supports a strong supposition that ICE is not required to follow through
with the removal period upon release from pretrial confinement.
C. Two Different Maneuvers to Deny Undocumented Defendants Bail
1. Interpreting Removal By ICE to be a Flight Risk Under the BRA
The court in United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez stated what is well
known to those that attend arraignments and detention hearings in federal
criminal cases and what is less known to those that do not: that "[i]n
numerous cases throughout the United States, the government has argued
for the retention of persons charged with illegal reentry who are the subject
of an ICE detainer."' 17  It explains that the reasoning behind the
government's argument is that, "the existence of the ICE detainer and the
possibility that the person may be removed or deported by ICE before trial
is sufficient under the BRA to satisfy the government's burden of showing
that there are no conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the
defendant at trial."' 18
The idea that this argument is occurring, and succeeding, is frequently
supported by the most relevant statistics available. In 2009, according to
the aforementioned 2009 DOJ report, 95% of immigration defendants (of
which, as mentioned above, Illegal Reentry defendants compromise around
80%) were detained prior to trial. 1 9 Without context, one may assume that
a 95% pretrial detention rate is the norm, but it is not. For comparison,
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(A) (2012).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(B) (2012).
117. 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176 (D. Or. 2012) (holding that the Government's flight
argument was constitutionally unsound and ICE's detention of the defendant during trial was a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights).
118. Id.
119. 2009 REPORT, supra note 66, at 10.
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defendants with two or more failures to appear are detained 86.3% of the
time.1o Those with five or more prior convictions and those charged with
violent felonies were detained prior to trial 88.6% and 90.4% of the time,
respectively.' 2 ' Once again, the Southwestern federal districts, where the
caseload is especially immigration heavy, stand out with a pretrial detention
rate of 88.3% for all defendants, while other all other districts combined
averaged a pretrial detention rate of 67.9%.122
Many courts, even at the district court level rather than at the
magistrate level, do not even fully confront this issue before accepting the
government's argument when it is brought before them.12 3 The courts find
that the certainty of the issuance and execution of the removal order upon
the defendant's release deem it necessary to detain the defendant pre-
trial.12 4 This comes from the certainty in the language of the INA regarding
the inevitability of removal once the short removal period begins.12 5
Nevertheless, this is not explicitly listed as something for a judge to
consider under the BRA.
Therefore, because immigration issues are not explicitly mentioned as
a consideration, the government argues, and courts regularly agree, that it
should be swept into the consideration under 8 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3), which
allows for the consideration of the history and characteristics of the
defendant.12 6  This, by itself, is not a stable analysis, as immigration
language is explicitly used almost directly before this set of factors in the
text of the BRA, but is not explicitly mentioned amongst the factors
themselves.12 7 More importantly, while being an immigrant illegally in the
United States may be a characteristic of an individual, being subject to a
removal order is more easily described as a status, which is considered
more specifically in a judge's analysis.
The courts and prosecutors that follow this flawed line of reasoning
state that to release these defendants and allow them to be deported is akin
to issuing them "get out of jail free cards." 28 Beyond the bleak reality that
120. 2009 REPORT, supra note 66, at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 910 F. Supp. 2d. (N.D. Iowa 2012) (finding that
the certainty of a deportation order deemed it necessary to detain a defendant pretrial); United
States v. Lozano, No. 1:09-CR-158-WKW[WO], 2009 WL 3834081, at *4-*6 (M.D. Ala. Nov.
16, 2009) (similarly taking it for granted that the defendant will be deported).
124. Lozano, No. 1:09-CR-158-WKW[WO], 2009 WL 3834081, at *6.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2012).
126. Brief for Appellee in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae at 3-4, United States v. Millan-
Vasquez, No. 13-1324 (8th Cir. 2013), (which is an appeal of Ramirez-Hernandez, supra note
120); 150 F.Supp.2d at 1307.
127. § 3142(g) is close in proximity to § 3142(d).
128. Brief for Appellee, supra note 126, at 3 (citing United States v. Campos, No. 2: 10-mj-
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many of the defendants facing removal rather than criminal prosecution will
still be punished in the form of removal to a country where they may be in
danger or far away from the families and support networks, it is also
incorrect because of the legal reasoning discussed at the end of IV(B). ICE
may not begin removal proceedings until after a final judgment is reached
in a case and the defendant has been released from the detention or
confinement that is the result of that judgment. 129
In response to a defendant's common-sense argument that in order for
an individual to flee, the individual must flee under their own volition, the
government argues that "the plain language of the Bail Reform Act says
nothing about volition. See § 3141-3156."l30 This assertion is absurd for
two reasons. First, there is a subsection in a different, but related portion of
the BRA that clearly suggests that volition is an element in flight. The
BRA's affirmative defense for failing to appear reads:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that
uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from appearing
or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to the
creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the
requirement to appear or surrender, and that the person appeared or
surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist. 1 3 1
It is arguable that a defendant illegally in the United States originally
began the causal chain. However, this theoretical causal chain would break
when an executive agency, after the defendant has been ordered released by
a judge, transfers the defendant to a different executive agency in order to
remove the defendant to a location beyond the U.S. border. Then, if the
defendant crosses that border in order to make the court date, the defendant
would be risking capture by the latter executive agency and subsequent
criminal charges prosecuted by the former executive agency. These
circumstances qualify as uncontrollable circumstances beyond the
defendant's control. Also suggesting that the defendant did not contribute
to the creation of their failure to appear is that the original entering was not
specifically "in reckless disregard of the requirement to appear or
surrender."l3 2 This affirmative defense, while in a separate statute within
the BRA, directly addresses the question of whether volition is required in
the BRA's definition of flight and counsels that the circumstances in
question are beyond the defendant's control.
6-SRW, 2010 WL 454903, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2010)).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(A) (2012).
130. Brief for Appellee, supra note 126, at 11-15.
131. 18 U.S.C. §3146 (2012).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (2012) (emphasis added).
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The second reason the assertion that volition is not necessary for flight
is absurd can be found in the dictionary. Webster's Dictionary defines
flight as "an act or instance of running away." 1 The volition that is
inescapably implied by this definition is not academic, but critical to the
everyday use of the word. However, it is not merely the words of the
definition of "flight" that cause this argument to be absurd. It is absurd
because the argument entirely undermines the fact that Congress
intentionally and specifically used the word "flight" in order to reflect the
People's collective notion of justice regarding this specific scenario.
Surely, arguing over the definitions and the intended use of words
constitutes a great deal of real-world lawyering. Yet, those attorneys that
execute the power of our nation's criminal code and begin every court
appearance by stating that they represent "the People of the United States of
America," may not willfully turn a blind eye to the uncontroversial
definition of a commonplace word.
Further, the common sense definition of the word "flight" implies that
the entity the individual is running away from should not be the same entity
forcing the individual to run away. To state it in clearer terms: the
government's argument violates basic principles of the separation of
powers. The courts that have rejected the government's flight argument
have primarily focused on this issue and have done so in unequivocal
language. In United States v. Castro-Inzunza, an unpublished order, the
Ninth Circuit overturned a district court in holding that a reinstated removal
order did not lead to an automatic justification of detention under the
BRA.134 The court stated that one shortcoming of the government's attempt
to carry its burden of showing that the defendant was a flight risk was that it
failed to show that it was unable to:
enjoin[] the government from interfering with his ability to appear
at trial. Additionally, the government has not shown that it lacks
the ability to stay or defer defendant's removal through a stay or
departure control order if it believes that his removal before trial
would be contrary to public interest.' 35
Other district courts across the country have stated this proposition in
less gentle terms. In United States v. Barrera-Omana, Judge Rosenbaum
noted that the true problem in front of him was not whether the defendant
would flee, but whether two executive agencies would be able to coordinate
their efforts.13 6 He then cautioned that, "[i]t is not appropriate for an Article
133. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 870 (1993).
134. No. 12-30205, 2012 WL 6622075 (9th Cir. July 23, 2012).
135. Id. at *1.
136. 638 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111-12 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding that the defendant was
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III judge to resolve Executive Branch turf battles.""'
The United States v. Marinez-Patino court pushed further and
questioned one aspect of Judge Rosenbaum's statement: his presumption
that this problem arises from a lack of coordination.' 3 8 Generally, in these
scenarios a defendant is never physically released from the one agency and
then picked up by the next, but simply transferred from one to the other.'39
The Marinez-Patino court observed that the defendant had been brought
before it as a "result of both the United States Attorney's Office and ICE-
two Executive Branch agencies-exercising their discretion in a
coordinated effort to serve the public interest as they see it."' 4 0 The court
then refused to accept an argument that "ICE's interest in deporting the
defendant would suddenly trump the United States Attorney's interest in
prosecuting the defendant," because it ignored the very cooperation that
made the prosecution possible in the first place.141
The argument asserted by prosecutors and often accepted by courts,
that an alien defendant is a flight risk due to a chance that a defendant will
be removed by ICE against their will, twists laws until they no longer
represent their true intent and violates the most basic tenant of our structure
of government. The argument's effect is likely seen in both the contorted
detention rates of immigration offense defendants and the detention rates in
the region in which most immigration offense defendants are prosecuted.
Not only does the argument disregard relevant laws and the separation of
powers, but it also violates many individual rights set out in the
Constitution, which will be discussed in further detail in IV(C)(3).
2. ICE Disobeys Court Orders to Detain Defendant For Trial
If the defendant prevails at the detention hearing and is allowed to post
bail or be released on the defendant's own recognizance, there remains
another common maneuver the government could make to effectively deny
the defendant bail. As discussed in IV(A), ICE would have ten days to
bring the defendant into their custody before the defendant would be
released. While this triggers the removal process, defendants may continue
to be criminally prosecuted during this time, effectively a denial of bail.
This scenario occurs less often than the previous scenario because
undocumented defendants are rarely released from pretrial detention, courts
are less receptive to the maneuver, and defense attorneys are typically
eligible for bail).
137. 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
138. No. I l-CR-64, 2011 WL 902466 (N.D. Ill. Mar.14, 2011) (rejecting the government's
argument that the defendant was a flight risk due to the ICE detainer placed on him).
139. Id at *2; see also 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
140. Id. at *7.
141. Id.
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aware that their clients will not receive criminal custody credits while likely
in the ICE custody. While prosecutors seeking this scenario are far less
successful in court, the denial of the right to bail generally does not occur in
court, but rather is left unaddressed in the courtroom due to either a lack of
incentive to challenge the practice or a lack of knowledge of its improper
nature.
In Trujillo-Alvarez, the government argued in the alternative that,
"[t]he Ninth Circuit [in Castro-Inzunza] properly concluded that [the ICE
detainer] did not [by itself justify detention under the BRA], but the court of
appeals said nothing about ICE's ability to take the defendant back into
administrative custody."1 4 2 The court stated that the government argument
likely has merit but that, "nothing permits ICE (or any other part of the
Executive Branch) to disregard the congressionally-mandated provisions of
the BRA by keeping a person in detention for the purpose of delivering him
to trial when the BRA itself does not authorize such pretrial detention."1 4 3
Rather than reading in favor of ICE detaining individuals for criminal
prosecution, the relevant administrative regulations, statutes, and
constitutional rights clearly forbid this practice. The purpose of an
immigration detainer, which ICE issues to any law enforcement entity when
ICE is aware that the entity has an alien in its custody and ICE is seeking
custody, is explicitly "for the purpose of arresting and removing the
alien."1 44 Two other regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 215.2(a) and 8 C.F.R. §
215.3(g), fuse together to suggest that the DOJ prioritizes criminally
prosecuting an individual over removing that individual.145  This
interpretation comports with the previously discussed 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii),
which demands that removal proceedings begin after the alien is released
from the detention or confinement that stems from a final judgment.
Fundamentally, this maneuver to deny bail, like the maneuver
discussed above, can be traced back to separation of powers violations. As
the court in Trujillo-Alvarez states, there is nothing stopping the executive
branch from detaining a defendant in ICE custody once the defendant is
released on bail. However, it must be for the purposes of removal. To
continue the criminal prosecution would be to allow a lack of coordination
in the executive branch to violate an order of the judicial branch, a law
tailored by the legislative branch, and the Constitution.
142. 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (citing Govt.'s Am. Supplemental Mem. of Law, at 8 (Doc.
24)).
143. Id.
144. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2012).
145. 8 C.F.R. § 215.2(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(g) (2012).
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3. Both Maneuvers Violate Individual Rights Enshrined in the
Constitution
In United States v. Salerno, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the
notion that, "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial
or without trial is the carefully limited exception."1 4 6  This notion is
confirmed in the U.S. Constitution in multiple forms across multiple
amendments. Both maneuvers described above violate this notion in the
context of bail. Therefore, the right they most explicitly deny
undocumented immigrants is the Eighth Amendment right to be free of
excessive bail. This is abundantly clear in the case of ICE detaining an
individual for the purposes of criminal prosecution after the individual has
been released on bail. The Salerno Court stated that in order "to determine
whether the Government's response is excessive, we must compare that
response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of
that response." 4 7  Here, Congress has enacted the BRA, an act that
prescribes the avenues through which a judge will weigh the proper
response to protect the interests the executive may be interested in
protecting,148 namely, public safety and the defendant's presence at trial. 14 9
Once a judge determines through these legislated procedures that the
interest the government seeks to protect is adequately protected and releases
the defendant on bail or on recognizance, to detain the defendant is clearly
an excessive response. The threat of this unconstitutional practice coupled
with the defendant's inability to accrue custody credits while in ICE
custody chills a defendant's right against excessive bail, which is equally
unconstitutional.
The government's argument that possible removal constitutes a flight
risk is also a violation of the Eighth Amendment for essentially the same
reason. Simply, to detain an individual, who would otherwise be released
because the interest of assuring the defendant's appearance is deemed
satisfied, due to the executive branch's unwillingness to coordinate within
itself is an excessive response to protect that interest. The proper response
to protect that interest is executive branch coordination.
The Due Process Clause is implicated by these maneuvers in two
ways. First, as Chief Justice Rehnquist's aforementioned words imply, it is
a fundamental right to be free of detention that lacks due process in the
form of a lawful detention hearing or trial.150 This right is rooted deep in
146. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that portions of the Bail Reform Act allowing for
specified instances of pretrial detention are not facially unconstitutional).
147. Id at 754.
148. Id at 742.
149. Id.
150. Id at 755.
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this nation's history, was important enough to enshrine in the Eighth
Amendment, and is integral to the concept of personal liberty. The
executive branch detaining an individual, either because of an
unconstitutional argument that violates the separation of powers or from a
lack of compliance with a ruling of the judicial branch, is a denial of Due
Process.
Second, this executive policy violates the Equal Protection Clause,
which is applicable to the federal government via the Due Process
Clause.' 5 ' As displayed in section II, undocumented Latino immigrants are
a discrete and insular minority as defined by Justice Stone in the famous
Carolene Products footnote.152  The government does not have a
compelling interest for this policy because the legislative branch crafted the
BRA to provide structure to the weighing of the government's interests
against the individual's liberty and an officer of the judicial branch weighs
those interests in each specific case. Once the defendant is released (or
would have been released if it were not for an unconstitutional argument),
the government's interest is no longer compelling because the interest
evaporates entirely. If this analysis were done under rational basis scrutiny
the result would be the same: once the execution of the apparatus designed
to manage these state interests determines that the defendant is to be
released, any rational interest within the executive's policy's purpose
disappears.
Lastly, both of these maneuvers to deny bail violate the defendant's
Right to Counsel. ICE detention facilities are often far away from the
federal district in which the defendant was discovered to have committed a
crime. To keep a defendant detained in a facility far from where an
attorney would be able to contact the defendant and effectively collaborate
creates an undue hardship.'53 This applies, albeit to a lesser extent, in the
context of detaining the defendant for risk of removal. Unnecessary
detention places an undue hardship on the client and attorney's abilities to
effectively prepare a case.
V. Conclusions About Illegal Reentry, the Systematic Denial
of Bail to Undocumented Defendants, and Their Roles as
Tools of Social Control
It is always clearer to view how policies of the past offend our values
and violate our laws and Constitution than it is to see these offenses
occurring in real time. In the present, these sorts of policies are difficult to
151. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 499, 499-500 (1954).
152. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
153. 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
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fit into an easily comprehendible narrative. The policies are deemphasized
as our daily norms tend to encumber both our values and the effort we are
willing to expend to achieve the actualization of those values. Moreover,
the daily fear of the future's unknowns weighs much heavier in the present
than it ever does in retrospect. To some, the pervasive use of Illegal
Reentry and the systematic denial of bail to undocumented defendants may,
in the ahistorical traditional immigration "problem" construct, be seen as a
rational approach to stop criminals from entering the country and fleeing
the prosecution of their crimes. However, once the two practices are
appraised through the proper historical context of continued widespread
social control and their mechanics are examined, they are readily seen for
what they are: two harsh tools of social control that are not in accord with
the Constitution or this country's laws and values.
Racism is frequently a powerful ingredient in this real-time
indifference, and is elemental throughout the history of social control of
undocumented Latino immigrants. It has promoted the arrogance from
O'Sullivan's claim of Manifest Destiny until present day. A job being
described as "Mexican" still implies that it is dangerous, insecure, and
unregulated. This has been so since the mid-19th century, through the
Bracero Program, and until today because in an immediate moment there is
always an assumption that, even if an undocumented immigrant deserves to
be treated with respect and dignity under the laws of the United States, they
would be lucky to receive that treatment as their mere presence in this
territory "conquered by Providence"1 5 4 is an unlawful opportunity.
Additionally, racism can magnify the fear of the future's unknown.
The same backlashes against undocumented migrants are no less deeply felt
today as they were in decades past, just as they are no less deeply flawed.
The concerns of today are strikingly similar to those of white citizens
leading up to the Great Depression mentioned in Section II, such as in
bilingual education, '55 public benefits, 156 health risks, 57 and crime, persist
and can often lead to similarly discriminatory laws. Whether it be from
indifference or ignorance, emboldened by racism or not, injustices resulting
from systems of social control that occurred in the past did not seem to be
unjust to the majority at the time, just as the injustices resulting from
systems of social control that future generations will see occurring in the
present may not seem to be unjust in our time.
Over the last half century there has been a vast expansion in the use of
154. Zinn, supra note 12.
155. Cal. Educ. Code § 305 (2012).
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
157. The Daily Show With Jon Stewart, Immigrant Disease, COMEDY CENTRAL (June 28,
2007), http://www. thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-june-28-2007/immigrant-disease.
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criminal laws to provide the social control that previous laws, which were
more explicitly based on traits or statuses and therefore legally or morally
unacceptable, previously provided.'58 Immigration control is not immune to
this trend, and has continuously become further criminalized for the
purpose of social control.15 9 This has coupled with the "'immigrant-crime
nexus' [that] has been a public concern from colonial times to the present,"
to construct a positive feedback loop.' 60  The criminalization of these
offenses causes a faux spike in the immigrant crime rate, which, because
immigrant crime is a constant hot button issue, begets more criminalization
of immigration.' 6' Expansion and enhancement of this realm of crimes is
effective "both as a tool of social control and as a potential device for
demonstrating that the government is effective in removing 'undesirables'
to control a manufactured public fear." 62  Applying this proper
understanding of the historical social control of undocumented Latino
immigrants and the expansive use of the criminal law to achieve this social
control to Illegal Reentry and the denial of bail, it becomes clear that they
are effective, unjust tools in the current system of social control.
Certainly, a country has a right to enact and enforce a statute that
deters serious criminal offenders who do not have a legal right to be in the
country from entering its borders. Yet, if that is the primary purpose of
Illegal Reentry, it functions like a chainsaw when a scalpel is required. It is
frequently used to incarcerate and remove individuals who have lived in the
U.S. since shortly after birth and return to reunite with their families and
communities after their removal. Out of this group, those with a small
number of misdemeanors or a single felony face stiff punishment. Those
whose prior offenses can be classified within the ever-expanding
classification of what constitutes an aggravated felony face two decades in
federal prison before deportation. The fact that these penalties can be
levied at an individual who committed their previous offense decades in the
past is entirely divorced from the ideal of rehabilitation that, in theory, runs
deep in the fabric of the ethos of the United States. This ideal of
rehabilitation is further destroyed in one of two ways, depending on which
country an individual primarily lives. The individual may be incarcerated
in the country their family and community resides in, be removed, and face
another lengthy prison sentence if they return to everyone they have ever
known. Or if the individual primarily resides outside of the United States,
their family or community members will likely be unable to ever visit them
158. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 20-58 (2012).
159. Warner, supra note 91, at 72.
160. Id at 58.
161. Id. at 65.
162. Id at 72.
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while incarcerated and they will then be removed to a family or community
they no longer have connections with.
Taking into consideration the data as well as the manner and frequency
with which the offense is prosecuted, Illegal Reentry is frequently being
utilized, and utilized harshly, against individuals who are not the threat it
was originally intended to stop. Prosecutors virtually never turn down an
opportunity to prosecute the offense and it is without the built-in
considerations of time since prior offenses that could result in more
properly tailored sentences. Combining this with the unprecedented
frequency with which it is charged and the systems of targeted policing put
in place to qualify more and more individuals to be prosecuted under it, it is
clear that there is no process put in place to discern between who can be
held to answer for this harshly penalized offense and who should be. While
it may not apply to each individual case, the pattern and practice of the use
of the statute indicates that Illegal Reentry's primary purpose is to
incarcerate, and more importantly remove, undocumented Latino
immigrants en masse.
The process of systematically denying bail to undocumented
defendants, many of them Illegal Reentry defendants, is a tool of social
control that is not only effective, but reflective of a blatant adherence to the
values of the social control over the foundational rights of criminal justice.
It is effective because "pretrial detention has the latent consequence of
increasing the likelihood of conviction and incarceration."1 63  With the
uninterrupted detention of the defendant, the government provides itself
with a 100% chance of the defendant's capture. This is where the reflection
of the values of social control begins to appear. The purpose of the possible
removal argument and ICE detention of a defendant for criminal
prosecution is not related to a potential harm that may occur, but about
absolute assurance of incarceration and removal. If the purpose was truly
based on flight alone, then a judge's determination, guided by the use of a
legal instrument designed by Congress to ensure that defendants appear and
have a hearing devoted to applying that instrument to an individual
defendant, should suffice to assure future apprehension of the defendant. It
is not about guilt and innocence when an undocumented defendant is
prosecuted, but about absolute certainty that if incarceration and removal
are not achieved, then at least removal will be. Whether it is a fraudulent
argument posed by the government or ICE holding a defendant awaiting
criminal prosecution, the individual rights that are so fundamental that they
are enshrined in our laws and our Constitution are bypassed in the
incarceration and removal process of unwanted individuals.
The over-prosecution of the imprecise offense of Illegal Reentry and
163. Warner, supra note 91, at 63.
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the denial of bail to undocumented defendants are not properly tailored to
reduce harms the government is constitutionally permitted to reduce. The
data, overly harsh punishments, lack of discretion in how they are utilized,
and disregard for individual rights displays that the primary purpose is as a
tool to assure the incarceration and removal of undocumented Latino
immigrants. The targeted policing and criminalization of immigration
enforcement allow increasing amounts of undocumented immigrants to be
incarcerated and removed in ways that do not comport with the Constitution
or reflect a dedication to removing only those immigrants who society
deems truly dangerous. In these times of high unemployment, instead of
public skepticism of these inadequate procedures, the mainstream public
cannot seem to get enough of what it sees as an effort to answer the illegal
immigration "problem." Immigrants with prior offenses, which are
becoming increasingly easy for authorities to create, provide a large pool
and an unsympathetic label for those being subjected to these improper
processes. Largely because of these two tools, there is currently a massive
wave of defendants being incarcerated and removed with little respect to
their rights. By no means is this as abhorrent as the repatriation procedures
of the Great Depression Era or the deportations during Operation Wetback,
but the pervasive use of these two tools demonstrates that this system of
responsive social control is still alive and well, is still causing suffering on a
massive scale, and is still managing to overcome any hurdles that laws,
constitutional interpretation, or societal values place in its path.
There is no magic solution to ending this system of social control or
abating these two tools of it, but there are ways to further extinguish the
injustices and suffering that are caused by them. It begins, of course, by
sustaining and hastening this society's slow, gradual improvement on the
issue of race. Those that clamor for the suffering and removal of
undocumented immigrants in the name of their own safety and economic
wellbeing can start by remembering that "those who live with us are our
brothers; that they share with us the same short moment of life; that they
seek-as we do-nothing but the chance to live out their lives in purpose
and happiness, winning what satisfaction and fulfillment they can,"16 and
move forward with the realization that they have much more in common
with the immigrants illegally crossing the border than they do with those
that benefit the most from this system of social control that they each play a
role.
More tangibly, the initial steps to ameliorate the current injustices of
the overcharging of Illegal Reentry and the denial of bail to undocumented
164. Senator Theodore Kennedy, Eulogy of Robert F. Kennedy (June 8, 1968) (roughly
quoting Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Day of Affirmation Speech (June 6, 1966)), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ekennedytributetorfk.html.
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defendants are three-fold. First, disincentivize prosecutors from charging
the offense without care to the facts of the case. This can be achieved by
not allowing the resulting convictions to count towards conviction totals or
rates, unless one of a select set of prior crimes was involved or the
defendant has surpassed a numerical limit of convictions. Second, amend §
1326 to take into account the duration of time that has passed since the prior
offense or, alternatively, provide an expungement procedure. Finally,
regarding the denial of bail, defense attorneys must actively utilize the few
properly reasoned decisions by federal courts around the country to solidify
this proper interpretation of the interplay between the BRA and INA, in
order to ensure that all undocumented defendants are entitled to the rights
they deserve in the criminal process.
The road to reform these specific unjust tools, and this system of social
control as a whole, is a long and difficult one. As history shows, it is true
that the "arc of the Moral Universe is long, but It bends toward Justice."' 65
However, it does not bend itself. That job is left up to those who do not
wait to see the injustices in retrospect and work against them in the present.
165. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 10th Annual Session of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference: Where Do We Go From Here? (Aug. 16, 1967).
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